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Summary findings
Only recently has the debate on bank capital regulation  provisioning practices around the world. They find that
devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss  in the vast majority of cases banks tend to delay
provisions can play as part of a minimum capital  provisioning for bad loans until it is too late-When
regulatory framework. Several national regulators have  cyclical downturns have already set in-possibly
adopted or are planning to introdure  a cyclically  magnifying the impact of the economic cycle on the
adjustable requirement for loan loss provisions, and the  income and capital of banks.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is considering  Notwithstanding the considerable variation in the
how to provide adequate treatment to provisioning  patterns followed by banks around the world, Laeven
practices within a broad bank capital regulatory  and Majnoni find that the size and timing of provisions
framework.  tend to improve with the level of economic development.
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Risk-based bank minimum capital requirements tend to have a pro-cyclical effect
on the economy (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2000). The deterioration of
the  quality  of bank  loan portfolios during  economic downturns inevitably  increases
banks'  risk exposure - and therefore the level of capital requirements - exactly when
capital becomes more expensive or simply unavailable to weaker institutions.
The discussion on this topic has raged ever since the 1988 Capital Accord was
originally enforced in GIO economies and subsequently, following the introduction of
Basle-like approaches by most developed and emerging countries around the world. On
one  side  it has  become  widely perceived  that  risk  exposures need  to  be  explicitly
mirrored in the level of bank capital if regulatory arbitrage is to be avoided and bank
stability pursued. On the other side, potential negative externalities of capital regulation
have been  stressed, pointing to  the  contraction  of  credit  supply  that  higher  capital
requirements may  generate  during  economic  downturns. In  general,  critics  of  the
solvency ratios discipline warn that controlling individual risk positions may not always
minimize systemic risks and strict capital standards may, for instance, have aggregate
undesirable liquidity effects.
The  discussion has  become  more  animated in  the last  couple of  years  as a
consequence of  the  ongoing  revision  of  the  old  Basle  Capital  Accord.  This  paper
contributes to the ongoing debate by focusing on a frequently ignored aspect of bank
capital regulation: the role of bank loan loss reserves as a component of bank regulatory
capital. The question addressed is twofold. First, are there good reasons - conceptual and
empirical - for a specific regulation of loan loss reserves within the general regulation of
1solvency ratios? Second, is it likely that a distinct treatment of loan loss reserves may
affect the pro-cyclical features of capital regulation?
Following  what  appears to  be  the  consensus view  among practitioners  and
analysts of  risk  management  we  relate  the volume  of  bank  capital  to  the  size of
unexpected credit losses and loan loss reserves to the size of expected losses. We also
argue that, consistently with this view, loan loss reserves should be left free to fluctuate
over the cycle and comply with a minimum requirement to be respected on average over
a predefined  period and  not  at every  single moment  in  time.  A  constant minimum
requirement  would  therefore  apply  to  economic capital  and  an  average  minimum
requirement would instead apply to loan loss reserves. This approach would clearly strike
a balance between the supporters of the opposing views of a  fixed versus adjustable
solvency regulation, but its relevance can hardly be defined at a theoretical level. Only an
empirical verification can show whether bank managers are already pursuing a desirable
pro-cyclical cyclical management of loan loss provisions and reserves, making additional
regulatory incentives useless.
This paper therefore proceeds to analyze the cyclical patterns of bank loan loss
provisions followed by large commercial banks in  different geographical areas of the
world. We anticipate some of the relevant results, noting that clearly different patterns
prevail  according to  the location of  the  banks. Bankers  on  average  create too  little
provisions in good times and are then forced to increase them during cyclical downturns
magnifying losses and the size of negative capital shocks. These patterns are considerably
diversified within the  group  of  industrialized  countries  as well  as  within  emerging
2economies. Larger and more timely provisions, though, appear to be positively affected
by the level of economic development.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 draws from the current debate on the
cyclical impact of banks'  capital requirements. Section 3 discuss the role of bank loan
loss  provision  in  the  current debate  of  banks'  minimum solvency ratios. Section  4
describes the empirical analysis and the data. Section 5 reports the empirical results, and
Section 6 concludes.
2.  Bank capital requirements and the economic cycle.
The cyclical effects of bank capital regulation have been thoroughly analyzed by a
wide theoretical and empirical literature that has flourished in the  1990s following the
introduction  of  the  1988  Capital  Accord.  The  concern  raised  by  academic  and
policymakers in the wake of the new regulation was that new higher capital ratios could
lead to a reduced credit supply in periods of economic slowdown.
Concerns were twofold. On one side there was the preoccupation that the shift to
a new regulatory regime could impact negatively on the supply of credit with a once for
all effect. A second and more generalized concern was that a risk-based capital regulation
by  increasing capital requirements might increase the  likelihood of  capital shortages
during  recessions  potentially  reducing  the  supply  of  credit  to  the  economy.  The
expression  "capital  crunch"  was  coined  in  the  early  nineties  to  characterize  the
3simultaneous shortage of  capital and  the contraction in the supply of new  loans that
affected banks in New England during the early 1990s recession in the United States
A capital crunch could result in the reduction of total bank assets or alternatively
in a shift toward less risky assets such as government bonds. An extensive survey of the
empirical evidence available for industrialized economies, has concluded that "there is
some evidence that bank capital pressures during cyclical downturns in the US and in
Japan may have limited lending in those periods and contributed to economic weakness
in some macroeconomic sector" (Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, 1999). Recent
empirical evidence shows that the introduction of more severe capital regulation may
have reduced bank credit supply also across emerging economies (Chiuri et al., 2002).
These concerns have recently been  addressed by  policy makers  as well. The
Financial Stability Forum, for instance, has raised the question whether several features
of the new capital regulation currently discussed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision could increase the cyclical  fluctuations of the economy. In  response, the
Basel Committee has confirmed that risk-based capital requirements are inevitably pro-
cyclical (more capital is required during recessions exactly because credit risks in banks'
portfolios increase in  cyclical  downturns) and  suggested that the cyclicality question
should be addressed by means of different instruments. For examnple,  national supervisors
(under Pillar II  of the new accord) could request banks to  comply with  higher than
minimum capital requirements and leave bank capital free to fluctuate above that level.
See Bernanke and Lown (1991) and Peek and Rosengren (1995) for evidence in favor of the presence of a
capital crunch during the 1990-91 recession in the US. A contrary view is taken by Berger and Udell
(1994).
4At a theoretical level, an explicit treatment of the impact of capital requirements
on the level of economic activity is provided by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) in a model
that provides a rationale for applying lower solvency ratios in recessions. They find that,
in  a world where  agents both  in  the real  and in the  financial sector may be  capital
constrained, market-determined solvency ratios  are pro-cyclical, i.e., they  are higher
during expansions and lower during recessions. More precisely, they show that a negative
shock to banks'  capital negatively affects the level of economic activity and that the
lower level of investment generated by the capital crunch requires a reduction of market
determined solvency ratios.
Tirole  and  Dewatripont  (1994)  also  remark  that  the  lack  of  discrimination
between  idiosyncratic  and  macroeconomic  shocks  may  have  undesirable  effects
negatively affecting bank managers risk taking incentives. Bank managers would in fact
be  punished  both  for  idiosyncratic  shocks,  that  are  under  their  control,  and  for
macroeconomic shocks, that are independent from their control. They conclude that Basle
standards are "excessively tough on bank managers in recessions".
How can concerns about the cyclical effects of a risk based capital regulation be
reconciled with the Basel Committee assessment that risk based capital requirements are
a necessary ingredient of  financial stability? This paper  suggests that  a  compromise
between these opposing position may in fact exist. The suggested reconciliation is based
on  the recognition that  bank  capital  and bank  loan  loss  reserves  perform  different
functions and that  therefore their regulatory requirements could differ. For example,
while capital may be re,  dlated  by a fixed minimum requirement, loan loss reserves may
5be  required  to  meet  a  minimum requirement on  average  over  a  predefined  period,
allowing them to fluctuate over the cycle.
3.  Loan loss reserves and banks minimum capital requirements.
Current minimum solvency regulations commonly refer to a particular notion of
capital called "regulatory capital" which differs from "economic capital" and that results
from the sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (Berger et al., 1995). The bulk of Tier 1 capital
is represented by  paid-in capital and retained earnings, while Tier 2  capital includes
general loan loss reserves and a variety of bank liabilities characterized by a lower degree
of seniority with respect to other non-capital bank liabilities. The sum of Tier 1 and Tier
2 capital represents the numerator of the solvency ratio and needs to meet minimum
regulatory requirements.
We suggest  that  a  reconciliation  of  the  different  views  about banks  capital
requirements could be envisioned by considering a partition of regulatory capital based
not only on seniority considerations - as is the case for Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital - but also
and  foremost on  risk  management considerations.  Following the  general  consensus
among risk management analysts and practitioners, economic capital should be tailored to
cope with unexpected losses, and loan loss reserves should instead buffer the expected
component of the loss distribution. Coherently, loan loss provisions required to build up
loan loss reserves should be considered as a cost - that may be delayed  in time but
eventually will realize - differently from earnings which affect the stock of capital. A
more detailed description of the conceptual difference between loan loss reserves  and
provisions and capital and earnings is provided in Appendix 1.
6We can show that a loan provision management coherent with an increase of loan
loss reserves in good time and a decrease in bad times reduces bank profit volatility and
the probability of a negative shock to economic capital. For simplicity, consider a bank
with only loans as assets. Let L be the amount of bank loans, rL the lending rate and r the
average cost of funding. In this case, net interest income equals L *  (rL  - r).  Let bank
profits (7r)  be expressed by the difference between net interest income, operating costs
(OC) and the amount of asset depreciation (AD)
= L -(rL - r ) - OC -AD  (1)
Let the lending rate (rL) be defined as the sum of the risk-free interest rate (rf), the pro-
rated (unconditional) expected loss ratio E(d), the level of unit operating costs (c), and the
level of risk premium (k):
rL  =rf  +E(d)+k+c  (2)
By substituting equation (2) in (1) and abstracting from operating costs (we assume that
c*L=OC), we have that profits may be represented by the following equation:
or= L-. (rf  +k)  -r  +  (L *E(d ) -AD)  (3)
It is clear that, if asset depreciation is kept equal to the value of unconditional expected
losses  (AD = L *E(d)), the volatility of bank profits is not affected by the fluctuations of
credit losses over the cycle. To keep asset depreciation (AD) constant is sufficient for
loan loss provisions (LLP) to compensate the difference between realized credit losses
and average credit losses by taking positive values (LLP>O)  during cyclical expansions
7and  negative values (LLP<O) during downturns. As  a  result, loan loss reserves will
increase in good times and decrease in recessions.
Let us now consider, as an example, the extreme case where provisions are null
and credit losses have a bimodal distribution over the cycle. In this case during cyclical
downturns AD would reach high values  (ADH  = L*dH) while low values (ADL  = L*d)
would prevail  during booms. Expansions  would boost profits  (e>,r)  and downturns
would possibly generate losses (i<O<,z)  and negative shocks to capital.
The  technique  of  dynamically  adjusting  LLP  over  the  cycle  - often  called
statistical provisioning (Fernandez de Liz et al., 2000) - is therefore coherent with the
cyclical  oscillations of  reserves  proposed  by  Holmstrom and  Tirole  (2000),  giving
flexibility to  regulatory  capital (Tier  1  and Tier  2)  and  also  avoiding (or reducing)
negative shocks to economic capital (the core component of Tier 1). From a regulatory
viewpoint the flexibility of loan loss reserves requires only that regulatory requirements
be met on average over a predefined time interval and not continuously over the same
time period 2.
The application of this approach to the current Basel regulatory setting (where
general loan loss reserves are allowed to reach up to 1.25 per cent of risk weighted assets)
would translate in a minimum capital requirement of 6.75 per cent of risk-weighted assets
and an average requirement for loan loss reserves of 1.25 per cent of risk-weighted assets,
to be met over a pre-defined number of years (defined according to the average length of
an economic cycle). The level of regulatory capital would therefore vary over the cycle
2 It is interesting to observe the similarity with the regulation of compulsory reserves on bank deposit,
where several countries have moved from a fixed ratio to be met at each point in time to an average
8between a maximum of 9.25 per cent and a minimum of 6.75 per cent of risk-weighted
assets.
From  a  practical  perspective  this  additional  complication  of  bank  solvency
regulation could be avoided should bank managers already face a proper set of incentives
and  follow  "virtuous"  pro-cyclical  provisioning practices.  We  therefore  turn  to  the
empirical analysis of prevailing loan loss provisioning practices around the world where
different fiscal, accounting, and regulatory regimes may prevail and affect provisioning
patterns.
We could face two general situations. In the first, provisions would follow a pro-
cyclical (and desirable) pattern by which loan loss reserves are built up in good times and
depleted in bad times signaling a prudent pattern that does not require any additional set
of incentives. In the second case, where loan loss reserves follow an anti-cyclical pattern
by remaining low in good times and increasing in bad times, bank regulation may be
revised to provide a new set of incentives.
4.  The estimation procedure and the data.
To verify the nature of the relationship between banks'  earnings and to test our
hypotheses about the deterninants  of banks'  provisioning decisions, we  estimate the
following econometric relationship:
LLP,, =a+  .-EBPi,  +  -Li,,  +J-LGi  +-Ai  +9-T,  +±e,  (4)
requirement  to  be met  over  the reserve  holding  period.  The purpose,  as in this case,  was  that of avoiding
undesired negative externalities of prudential regulation on market liquidity.
9where loan loss provisions over total assets (LLP) for bank i at time t are a function of
profits before tax and loan loss provisions over total assets (EBP) for bank i at time t,
total loans over total assets (L) for bank i at time t, loan growth in real terms (LG) for
bank i at time t, the natural logarithm of total assets (A) for bank i at time t, and year
dummies (T). The dependent variable of the regression in (5) is the level of loan loss
provisions scaled by  total  assets. Our critical  explanatory variable is  given by  bank
income before taxes and provisions. We also control for bank asset portfolio composition,
its risk profile and its size. We use the ratio of loan to total assets as a proxy of portfolio
composition and we expect provisions to be positively related to the loans'  share. As
proxy of credit risk exposures we use the real growth rate of bank loans. This indicator is
thought to  be  positively  associated with bank  risk, given that  rapid growth of bank
lending is generally associated with lower monitoring efforts and a deterioration of the
quality of loan portfolios. A prudent bank should therefore show a positive association
between the amount of loan loss provisions and the growth rate of its loan portfolio. We
add the logarithm of total assets to control for a potential size effect: larger banks are
expected to be better equipped to manage their risk exposure or simply may benefit from
larger portfolio diversification opportunities. Year control dummies are intended to catch
time-specific effects such as trends in the regulatory stance.
In order to capture both economic upswings and downturns we need to use bank
data  for a  sufficiently long  period. We collect bank  balance  sheet information from
Bankscope for the period 1988-99. This period captures both the economic slowdown in
the US of the early 1990s (Peek and Rosengren, 1995) and the following upswing in the
mid and late 1990s. For other countries this period captures at least one business cycle,
10and for certain countries, notably the East Asian countries, an economic crisis (during
1997-98). Bankscope data refer to the set of large commercial banks in each country, for
which  accounting data are believed to be of better quality. Where possible we also use
consolidated balance sheets data. We include in our sample the countries that had over
the samnple  period at least three commercial banks recorded in the Bankscope database.
We have then  eliminated the banks that over  the sample period had  less  than three
consecutive years of balance sheet observations, in order to control for the consistency
and quality of bank reporting. Finally, in order to minimize the effects of measurement
errors and outliers we have filtered out the bank/year observations that exhibited one of
the following features:
- a ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets greater than 10%;
- a ratio of eamings before tax and provisions over total assets larger than 10%;
- a ratio of total loans over total assets smaller than 10 % or larger than 90%;
- a growth rate of bank loans in real terms larger than 50% in absolute value.
The resulting sample includes 37 countries3,  with a total of 1,205 banks.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about the variables in our estimation
sample. The ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets equals 0.56 per cent on average
(with a standard deviation of 0.84 per cent) and the ratio of earnings before taxes and
provisions to total assets equals 1.6 per cent (with a standard deviation of 1.2 per cent).
Loans represent 57.8 per cent of banks'  asset portfolios on average and the average real
rate of loan growth is equal to 4.2 per  cent. The average real per  capita GDP of the
3The  final  sample  of countries  is: Australia,  Belgium,  Canada,  Chile,  Colombia,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,
Germany,  Greece, India,  Indonesia,  Ireland,  Israel, Italy, Japan,  Jordan,  Korea, Malaysia,  Mexico, Netherlands,
New  Zealand,  Norway,  Pakistan,  Peru,  Philippines,  Portugal,  Singapore,  South  Africa,  Spain,  Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
11countries in our sample equals 2,200 US  dollars, and ranges from 500 to 45,000 US
dollars. A detailed description of the source and of the construction of each individual
variable is provided in Appendix 2.
Table  2  presents  the  correlation  matrix  of  the  regression  variables.  The
correlations indicate a statistically significant correlation between loan loss provisions
and each of the explanatory variables. The correlation between loan loss provisions and
earnings before tax and loan loss provisions is around 17 per cent.
We use both  fixed effects and random effects regressions to  allow for bank-
specific effects. The Hausman test indicates that we should rely on the random effects
estimates rather than the fixed effects estimates in most specifications. We therefore only
report the random effects regression results with their respective Hausman test statistics.
5.  Estimation Results.
Table 3 presents the regression results for the whole sample. We find a positive
relationship between the ratio of loan loss provisions over total assets and bank earnings,
consistently with previous results for the US market (Greenwald and Sinkey, 1988). At
first sight, therefore, banks in our sample seems to have followed on average an income
smoothing pattern. The ratio of loans over total assets has the desirable positive sign,
while the loan growth rate, contrary to expectations, has a negative coefficient. Banks
appear to have increased the amount of provisions together with the share of loans in
their portfolio but at the same time they have been less prudent during periods of rapid
credit and asset growth. We do not find a significant size effect: total bank assets are not
12related to the level of loan loss provisions once individual bank features have already
been captured  by  the random effects. The time dummies, not  reported in  the table,
indicate a decreasing trend over the sample period.
To  allow for an asymmetric pattern of  loan loss provisions during periods of
positive and negative earnings, we interact the earnings variable with a dummy variable
that takes value of one when earnings are negative and zero elsewhere (Column 2 in
Table 3). The results indicate that banks make higher provisions when they incur losses 4
than when  they generate a  positive level of  income before provisions and  tax. This
implies that during cyclical downswings banks eat into their capital to make provisions
for loan losses, and that therefore on average banks do not provision enough during good
times to cover losses during bad times.
The relation between bank earnings and loan loss provisioning is expected to be
highly country-specific. In particular, it is expected that banks in developing countries
experience  more  difficulty  in  smoothing their  income  than  banks  active  in  more
developed  economies due  to  the lack  of  adequate incentives and  a  poorer  level  of
information. To allow for a country-specific relation between bank earnings and loan loss
provisioning we interact the earnings variable with the level of GDP per capita (Column
3 in Table 4). We find that the positive link between bank earnings and provisions is
stronger for countries with a higher income level, suggesting that pro-cyclical behavior of
loan loss provisioning is higher in developed countries than in developing countries.
Column 4  in  Table 3  presents  the  regression  results  with  both  the  negative
earnings dummy and the level of income. We still find that banks provision more when
4 Note that  negative  EBP times  the negative  regression  coefficient  of the interacted  term  (negative  earnings
dummy*EBP)  implies  a positive  effect  (increase)  on provisions.
13they generate negative earnings but the level of per capita GDP is no longer significant.
The possibility of a non-linear relation between our proxy of development and the quality
of  bank  provisioning and risk  management has  suggested to  run  additional  separate
regressions for different subsets of countries.
To further analyze the different behavior across banks located in  countries at
different level of development we therefore ran a series of separate regressions for banks
active in different regions. For this purpose we consider four different regions: Europe,
US,  Latin America and Asia. "Europe"  includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Norway,  Portugal,  Sweden,  Spain,
Switzerland, and United Kingdom; "US" refers to the United States of America. "Latin
America" includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay; and "Asia"  includes
India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand. The results are
presented in  Tables 4  and 5. The regional regressions have two  advantages over the
whole sample regressions. First, they allow for cross-regional differences in each of the
regression  coefficients.  Second,  the  regional  regressions  do  not  suffer  from  an
overrepresentation of banks from one region, unlike the whole sample regressions, where
US banks represented a very large share of the overall sample.
Table  4 reports  the results  for the  four regions when  no  distinction is made
between periods  with positive  and  negative  earnings. Table  5  shows  the regression
outcome when the dummy for period of losses is added. For all the four regions we find
that banks with negative income (before tax and provisions) make more provisions than
banks with positive income. This  effect, however, is stronger for the Asian and Latin
America  countries, or  in  other  words  for  developing  countries.  This  suggests  that
14insufficient provisioning during good times is more common practice among banks in
Latin America and Asia than among banks in Europe and the US. Among banks with
positive income we find that the positive link with bank earnings is confirmed for banks
located in Europe, US and Latin America, but not for Asian banks. The average positive
link  between  earnings  and  loan  loss provisions  is,  however,  stronger  for US  and
European banks than for Latin American banks. This finding is consistent with the fact
that  Latin American  financial systems  suffer to  a  larger extent  from poor corporate
governance than their US and European counterparts.
Overall, the regional results suggest that the loan loss provisioning behavior of
Asian banks is the least pro-cyclical among the four considered regions. First, there is no
significant positive link between earnings and loan loss provisions for Asian banks with
positive income. Second, Asian banks with negative income provision much more than
their US, European and Latin American counterparts. This finding may be consistent with
the recent financial turmoil during  1997-98 in  the East Asian  countries, when it was
revealed that many East Asian banks did not set aside adequate provisions in the 1990s,
when credit  growth was still  strong, generating a  level  of  loan loss reserves  vastly
inadequate when compared with the available level of capital and the amount of loan
losses.
The negative relationship found  earlier for the  whole  sample between credit
growth and loan loss provisioning is consistent across each of the four regions. Assuming
that credit growth is a good proxy for bank risk, this suggest that banks across the globe
tend to underprovision in situations of exuberant markets.
15The amount of loans over total assets is positively related to the level of loan loss
provisioning only for European and US banks, showing a prudent behavior that is not
shared by banks located in emerging countries. Banks located in Latin America and in
Asia also show a larger negative relation with loan growth than European and US banks
confirming a more questionable approach to loan loss provisioning.
The absence of a size effect that we found for the whole sample is consistently
confirmed for each of the four regions indicating that there does not  seem to be  any
systematic difference in the degree of loan loss provisioning between large and small
banks.
Finally, although not reported in the tables we find differentiated and significant
time patterns across the four different regions. For example, in the US case we find that
the level of loan loss provisioning has been decreasing consistently over time during the
1990s. This finding is consistent with changes in the US regulation on bank minimum
capital that have diminished banks'  incentive to build up loan loss reserves. From 1992
onwards in fact, with the introduction of the Capital Accord in the US, loan loss reserves
were no longer counted as a component of Tier 1 capital, but were counted towards Tier
2 capital (up to 1.25% of the bank's risk-weighted assets). Hence, from the perspective of
compliance with regulatory capital requirements, it became much more effective for US
banks to allocate income to retained earnings (entirely included in Tier 1 capital) than to
loan loss reserves (only partially included in Tier 2 capital).
166.  Conclusions
This paper has suggested that among potential benefits deriving from a risk-based
regulation of loan loss provisions and reserves we should include a beneficial dampening
of the pro-cyclical  effects of capital regulation. The econometric evidence shows that
banks on average postpone provisioning when faced by favorable cyclical and income
conditions until negative conditions set in. As a result of very different regulatory and
institutional  frameworks,  rather  differentiated provisioning behaviors  prevail  among
banks located in different geographical areas. Not only differentiated patterns prevail
among  countries  at  different  levels  of  development,  but  also  within  industrialized
economies and within  emerging countries.  Better  level  of development  tends  to  be
conducive to more prudent patterns.
While it is becoming increasingly clear among bank regulators that more explicit
recognition should be  paid  to  the problems  associated with  inadequate provisioning
policies, the solution is not easy to define or to envision as a result of the complicated
interaction of accounting, fiscal and prudential requirements and responsibilities that are
particularly hard to extricate.
This paper provides some new empirical evidence that stresses the importance of
new developments in this area of bank regulation. It also shows that while progress may
benefit all countries, inclusive of more developed ones, it has a particular bearing for the
stability of emerging banking systems.
17Appendix 1:  Loan loss provisions, reserves, and expected losses. 5
Although  regulatory capital is  intended to  provide an adequate buffer  against
adverse occurrences to banks' balance sheets it is not the only relevant buffer bankers can
resort to. The prevailing conceptual framework, summarized in Figure 1, recognizes the
existence of two categories of shock absorbers: loan loss reserves and capital. Regulatory
capital should cope with  the occurrence of "unexpected losses", that is losses that are
large but  infrequent and that therefore can be located far  in the tail of the frequency
distribution of  loan  losses. Loan loss reserves  should,  instead, cope with  "expected
losses", that is losses which occur on average and can be measured by the mean value of
the frequency distribution of loan losses. According to this distinction, the occurrence of
losses equal to  OB in  Figure  1 should be buffered for the amount OA by  loan loss
reserves and for the amount AB by depleting regulatory capital. What Figure  1 makes
clear is that the very effectiveness of regulatory capital as a buffer of unexpected shocks
rests on the existence of the subsidiary buffer represented by the reserves created through
loan loss provisions.
Figure 1: PDF of loan losses, provisions and economic capital
Genera  Credit  risk  capital
Provisions
o  99th percentile
Expected  Unexpected
losses  losses
0  A  Loss  B
5 This section draws on Cavallo and Majnoni (2001).
18A final clarification concerns the nature of "specific" and "general" loan loss
provisions and their role in the definition of bank capital regulation. According  to
widespread  accounting  practices "general" provisions  refer to "ex-ante" provisions  and are
related to future uncertain events.  "Specific"  provisions  are instead  "ex-post" in nature, in
that they refer to certain events (such as past due payments,  or other default-like  events) for
which a specific  documentation  can be produced.
As such, "specific" provisions are somewhat similar to write-offs, can be easily
documented and are not subject to significant restrictions. "General" provisions, on the
contrary,  refer  to  probabilistic  losses  that  cannot  be  supported  by  loan  specific
documentation and being highly judgmental  have been often the subject of regulatory
restrictions. Not always bank regulations refer explicitly to general or specific provisions
but most of the times regulatory requirements can be partitioned among "ex-ante" and
3"ex-post"  provisioning. For instance, provisions triggered by past due payments (one of
the default events considered by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) could be
considered as "specific" provisions. Provisions which are, instead, required for all loans,
independently from the presence of a default event, can be considered of a "general"
nature.
Since bank solvency regulation is intended to address the consequences of future
credit losses, whether of expected or unexpected nature, only "general" provisions matter
in  the  discussion of  minimum bank  capital  requirements. "Specific"  provisions  and
reserves, similarly to write-offs,  should not  be  considered as  a buffer  against future
losses.
19Appendix 2:  Data Definition and Sources
Definition
Provisions/Assets = Loan Loss Provisions / Total Assets
Earnings  before  Provisions  /  Assets  =  (Profit  before  Tax  +  Loan  Loss
Provisions) / Total Assets
Loans / Assets = Total Loans / Total Assets
Loans in Real Terms =  Total Loans / Consumer Price Index
Loans Growth Rate =  [Loans in Real Terms (t-1) - Loans in Real Terms(t)] /
Loans in Real Terms (t-1)
GDP per Capita (in 1995 US Dollars) = GDP at constant 1995 US dollar market
prices / Total population
II.  Sources
Income Statement and Balance Sheet Items taken from Bank Scope
Loan Loss Provisions: - Bank Scope, summary code No: 2095
Profit before Tax - Bank Scope, summary code No: 2105
Total Loans - Bank Scope, summary code No: 2000
Total Assets - Bank Scope, summary code No: 2050
Series from the IMF and the World Bank
CPI (1995) = 100 - IFS line 64, IMF
GDP  at  market  prices  (constant  1995  US  Dollars)  - World  Development
Indicators, World Bank
Population, Total - World Development Indicators, World Bank
Gross Domestic Product - IFS line 99b,  1MF
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22Table 1  Summary Statistics
Provisioning/Assets equals loan loss provisions over total  assets. EBP/Assets equals
profits before tax and loan loss provisions over total assets. Loans/assets equals total
loans over total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. ln(real GDP per
capita) is the logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars). ln(Assets) is the
logarithm of assets in thousands of US dollar.
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Obs
Provisioning/Assets  .5639  .8390  6,152
EBP/Assets  1.6128  1.2039  6,152
Loans/Assets  57.8008  15.9696  6,152
Loan growth  4.2152  16.5022  6,152
ln(Real GDP per capita)  5.0481  1.0854  6,152
ln(Assets)  15.5803  1.4251  6,152Table 2  Correlation matrix
Provisioning/Assets  equals loan loss provisions over  total  assets. EBP/Assets equals
profits before tax and loan loss provisions over total assets. Loans/assets equals total
loans over total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. ln(real GDP per
capita) is the logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars). ln(Assets) is the
logarithm of assets in thousands of US dollar. * indicates significance at a 5% level.
Provisioning/  EBP/  Loan!  Loan  ln(Real GDP  ln(Assets)
Assets  Assets  Assets  growth  per capita)
Provisioning/  1.0000
Assets
EBP/  *0.1677  1.0000
Assets
Loans/  *0.1213  *0.1916  1.0000
Assets
Loan  *-0.2435  0.0181  *0.1845  1.0000
growth
ln(Real GDP  *-0.1589  *-0.1047  *0.0705  *0.0840  1.0000
per capita)
ln(Assets)  *-0.0395  *-0.1674  -0.0221  0.0080  *0.2024  1.0000Table 3  Random effects regression - Whole sample
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over total EBP/Assets equals profits before tax  and loan loss
provisions over total assets. Loans/assets equals total loans over total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. ln(real
GDP per capita) is the logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 1995 US dollars). Ln(Assets) is the logarithm of assets in thousands of
US  dollar. The negative earnings dummy takes value one  if profits before tax and loan loss provisions are negative,  and zero
otherwise. The Hausman test is a  test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects and the random effects
regression. We report the p-value of the Hausman test statistic. Year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard errors are
between brackets. * indicates significance at a 5% level.
Whole sample  With negative  With income level  With income level and
earnings dummy  interaction  negative earnings
interaction  dummy interactions
EBP/Assets  *.0840  *.1762  .0186  *.1348
(.0107)  (.0115)  (.0330)  (.0321)
Negative earnings dummy *(EBP/Assets)  - *-.7822  - *-.7799
(.0434)  (.0434)
ln(GDP per capita) * (EBP/Assets)  - - *.0140  .0088
(.0067)  (.0064)
Loans/Assets  *.0092  *.0080  *.0091  *.0079
(.0009)  (.0009)  (.0009)  (.0009)
Loan growth  *-.0123  *-.0116  *-.0123  *-.0116
(.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)  (.0006)
ln(Assets)  -.0110  .0068  -.0127  .0057
(.0116)  (.0110)  (.0117)  (.0111)
Hausman test (p-value)  *.000  *.000  *.000  *.000
R-squared  .1023  .1807  .1288  .1797
No obs  6152  6152  6152  6152Table 4  Regional regressions with random effects
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over total EBP/Assets equals profits  before tax and loan loss
provisions over total assets. Loans/assets equals total loans over total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. Ln(Assets)
is the logarithm of assets in thousands of US dollar. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if profits before tax and loan loss
provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. "Europe" includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Latin America ("LAC") includes Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. "Asia" includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand. "USA" indicates
United States of America. The Hausman test is a test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects and the random
effects regression. We report the p-value of the Hausman test statistic. Year dummies are included but  are not reported. Standard
errors are between brackets. * indicates significance at a 5% level.
Europe  US  LAC  Asia
EBP/Assets  *.1387  *1548  *.2080  *-.1586
(.0203)  (.0160)  (.0330)  (.0351)
Loans/Assets  *.0122  *.0116  .0074  .0049
(.0014)  (.0015)  (.0047)  (.0028)
Loan growth  *-.0120  *-.0072  *-.0138  *-.0177
(.0011)  (.0009)  (.0025)  (.0023)
ln(Assets)  -.0079  .0429  -.0355  -.0494
(.0183)  (.0178)  (.0654)  (.0416)
Hausman test (p-value)  *.002  *.000  .460  .083
R-squared  .2063  .3303  .3594  .2590
No obs  2239  2069  214  725Table 5  Regional regressions with random effects and negative earning dummies
The regressions are estimated using generalized least squares with random effects for the whole sample of countries and for the period
1988-1999. Dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions over total  EBP/Assets equals profits before tax and loan loss
provisions over total assets. Loans/assets equals total loans over total assets. Loan growth equals loan growth in real terms. Ln(Assets)
is the logarithm of assets in thousands of US dollar. The negative earnings dummy takes value one if profits before tax and loan loss
provisions are negative, and zero otherwise. "Europe" includes Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germnany,  Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Latin America ("LAC") includes Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay. "Asia" includes India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, and Thailand. "USA" indicates
United States of America. The Hausman test is a test of systematic difference between coefficients of the fixed effects and the random
effects regression. We report the p-value of the Hausman test statistic. Year dummies are included but are not reported. Standard
errors are between brackets. * indicates significance at a 5% level.
Europe  US  LAC  Asia
EBP/Assets  *.2006  *.2039  *.2605  .0718
(.0228)  (.0168)  (.0339)  (.0446)
Negative earnings dummy * (EBP/Assets)  *-.4150  *-.6074  *-.8236  *-.9283
(.0742)  (.0743)  (.1894)  (.1106)
Loans/Assets  *.0117  * .0100  .0056  .0021
(.0014)  (.0015)  (.0045)  (.0028)
Loan growth  *-.0115  *-..0067  *-.0158  *-.0180
(.0011)  (.0009)  (.0024)  (.0022)
ln(Assets)  -.0002  *.0454  -.0214  -.0135
(.0172)  (.0175)  (.0633)  (.0423)
Hausman test (p-value)  *.000  *.000  *.000  .188
R-squared  .2232  .3568  .4041  .3238
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